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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES
JAMES
I.

P.

TIMONY·

INTRODUCTION

In the first thirty years of their existence, federal administrative
law judges were involved in four disciplinary cases.· In the last six
years, fifteen such cases have been initiated. 2 The recent increase in
• Administrative Law Judge, Federal Trade Commission. Judge Timony is also
presently hearing cases for the International Trade Commission and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. B.S., Ohio University, 1954; LL.B., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1959; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1961.
The views expressed by the author in this article are his own.
I. In re Stecher, 11 Ao. L. REp. 20 (P & F) 868 (Civil Service Comm'n 1961) (mis
conduct; failure to accede to demand of director of personnel that judge come to direc
tor's office to discuss judge's sickness and other matters; 30 day suspension); McEachern
v. Macy, 233 F. Supp. 516 (W.D.S.C. 1964) (financial irresponsibility; failure to make
timely payments on bills for telephone and tires and debts to credit union and bank;
removal), f!!Td, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965); Bureau of Land Management v. Dumm,
No.3 (Civil Servo Comm'n Oct. 21, 1964) (misconduct; usc of government car for social
visit; fishing on ranch owned by a party in proceedings before him and accepting drinks
and dinner from same party; 31 day suspension); Hasson v. Hampton, 34 Ao. L. REp. 20
(P & F) 819 (D.D.C. 1973) (misconduct; acceptance of meals and entertainment from
representatives of a company which was a party in proceedings before him and staying
overnight in a hotel with a woman who was not his wife; removal).
Federal administrative law judges may also be removed for lack of funds, Ramspeck
v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 143 (1953), or for physical or
mental disability, Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017, 1025 (Ct. Cl. 1973); In re King,
3 M.S.P.B. 29 (1980).
2. National Transp. Safety Bd. v. Boyd, No.7 (Civil Servo Comm'n Feb. 14, 1978)
(misconduct; using government personnel and telephone for personal business; 20 day
suspension and loss of status as chief judge); In re Spielman, I M.S.P.B. 50, 5 I (1979)
(misconduct; misrepresentations on job application; 60 day suspension); In re O'Brien, I
M.S.P.B. 128 (1979) (low productivity; action dismissed upon agreement of judge to in
crease productivity); In re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 71 (1980) (misconduct; judge involved in
scuflle with hearing assistant who tried to remove paper from photocopier; suspension for
30 days); In re Chacallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980) (misconduct; judge refused to return case
files and conducted hearing on case after it was removed from her jurisdiction; demon
strated bias and lack of judicial temperament; removal); OSHRAC v. Weil, No.
HQ120100029, slip op. (M.S.P.B. March 16, 1981) (inefficiency; stipulation of dismissal);
SSA v. Arterberry, No. HQ7521820009 (MSPB May 31, 1983) (insubordination; judge
refused to travel out of local area to hear cases because of slow healing broken ankle; 30
day suspension); HHS v. Haley, No. HQ75218210052 (MSPB Apr. 20, 1984) (MSPB ac
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disciplinary proceedings has exposed flaws in the present system.
This article will examine these flaws and will offer remedies.
II.

GROWTH OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Although the principle ofjudicial discipline has been firmly es
tablished, 3 the removal or sanctioning of federal or state judges for
incompetence or misconduct was rare until very recently. From 1940
to 1975 fewer than twenty-five state judges were removed for mis
conduct.4 Only four federal judges have been removed by impeach
ment; the last in 1936. s The expense and awkwardness of the
disciplinary procedure undoubtedly contributed to this inactivity.
The traditional procedure involved impeachment or address by the
cepted stipulation) (30 day suspension for misconduct; use of government car for per
sonal purposes); SSA v. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Apr. 6, 1983)
(recommended decision of administrative law judge) (low productivity; judge made too
many detailed findings and was inefficient; removal), rev'd, No. HQ7521820015 (MSPB
Feb. 6, 1984) (MSPB denied agency's petition for removal; although judge heard about
half as many cases as national average, that average could not validly measure compara
tive productivity because cases diJfered in difficulty); SSA v. Shore, No. HQ75218210013
(MSPB filed Apr. 23, 1982) (low productivity; settled Apr. 8, 1983; judge retired); SSA v.
Glover, No. HQ 7521820025 (MSPB May 6, 1983) (recommended decision of adminis
trative law judge) (judge failed to show proper courtesy and consideration to co-workers;
120 days suspension); SSA v. Davis, No. HQ752 I 8210026 (MSPB Apr. 19,1983) (recom
mended decision of administrative law judge) (misconduct; lewd and lascivious behavior,
including salacious language concerning a female employee, lewd and obscene remarks
to another female, and indecently describing sexual availability and responsiveness of
female employees; removal), adopted as mod(/ied, No. HQ7521820026 (MSPB Feb. 6,
1984); SSA v. Manion, No. HQ75218210008 (MSPB June 17, 1983) (recommended deci
sion of administrative law judge) (misconduct - cancelled hearings after dispute with the
judge in charge of office over rule prohibiting hearing assistant travelling to out of town
hearing; 30 day suspension), adopted as mod(/ied, No. HQ75218210008 (MSPB Feb. 6,
1984); SSA v. Brennan, No. HQ75218210010 (MSPB June 23, 1983) (recommended deci
sion of administrative law judge) (low productivity and misconduct - contemptuous, dis
respectful and abusive remarks to administrative law judge in charge of office; judge
claimed that chief judge could only "go through the motion" of conducting hearings in
issuing 80-90 decisions per month; removal), rev'd and remanded, No. HQ21210010
(MSPB Feb. 6, 1984) (remanded for identification of evidence supporting discipline and
for credibility findings); SSA v. Balaban, No. HQ75218210014 (MSPB Feb. 9,1984) (low
productivity and failure to carry an acceptable workload; judge heard about half as many
cases as national average but that average could not validly measure comparative pro
ductivity because cases differed in difficulty; judge's workload "compared favorably"
with other judges in his office and workload was determined by volume of claims filed in
that office; charges dismissed).
3. "(TJhe courts ought not to hesitate. . .to protect themselves from scandal and
contempt, and the public from prejudice, by removing grossly improper persons from
participation in the administration of the laws." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
4. Comment, Judicial DisCipline, Remo"aI and Retirement, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 563,
564-65. In 1976 there were 22,000 state judges in the United States. Id. at 563.
5. 124 CONGo REc. S28,284 (daily ed. Sept. 7,1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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legislature or recall by referendum. 6 The only positive measure pro
vided was removal. As a result, cases were brought only for flagrant
misconduct.
In 1947, New York established the first Court on the Judiciary,
a special six-judge tribunal that convened only to hear cases of judi
cial misconduct or disability. Similar to legislative methods for re
moval, this special court lacked secrecy in screening complaints and
investigating alleged misconduct. Because the procedure was public,
and removal was the only sanction, it was used only for the most
notorious cases.' The Court on the Judiciary convened only twice
during its first eighteen years resulting in two removals and four
resignations. 8
California created its Commission on Judicial Qualifications in
1960 and structured the commission so as to avoid the problems in
herent in other· disciplinary methods. 9 The commission has nine
members, including judges, lawyers and lay citizens. Complaints
about judicial conduct received from any source, are investigated by
the agency and, if warranted, confidential adversarial hearings are
convened. 1o The commission then may recommend to the California
Supreme Court that the judge be retired for disability, censured or
removed for actions that constitute "willful misconduct in office,
willful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intem
perance or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute." 11
Until the commission recommends discipline to the Supreme
Court, the matter is secret. This procedure protects the judge from
the harm of adverse publicity from frivolous complaints, because a
full adversarial hearing will be held before any recommendation
concerning the judge is made public. It also allows the commission
to impose informal discipline short of recommending action to the
6. Comment, supra note 4, at 564-67. Impeachment is found in forty-six state con
stitutions and in the United States Constitution and ca1Is for a bill of impeachment by the
lower house and a trial in the upper house. Address exists in twenty-cight states and
requires a concurrent resolution of both houses, without provision for a trial. Referen
dum is a popular vote. Id. at 565.
Removal by impeachment, recall and referendum is still the only method ofjudicial
discipline used in Great Britain. S. SHETREET, JUDGES ON TRJAL 88 (1976).
7. I. TESITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 1-2 (1978).
8. Id. at 2; Comment, supra note 4, at 567-68.
9. Comment, supra note 4, at 568-72. The California plan is now called the Com
mission on Judicial Performance.
10. Id. at 571.
II. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 18(c).
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supreme court. Informal discipline is often very effective because it
allows the judge to correct transgressions without admitting guilt. 12
The California plan has been the model for judicial disciplinary
agencies. Now all fifty states and the District of Columbia have es
tablished such commissions. 13
Since 1980, federal judges and federal bankruptcy judges and
magistrates also have had a codified disciplinary system. 14 Federal
law provides for disciplinary action to be taken against these judges
by a judicial council of the circuit composed ofjudges. Such a coun
cil may, upon proof of "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expe
ditious administration of the business of the courts," (1) order that
no further cases be assigned to a judge or magistrate;IS (2) censure or
reprimand by means of private or public communication or by pub
lic announcement; 16 (3) order removal of a magistrate pursuant to 28
U.S.c. § 631, or the removal of a bankruptcy judge pursuant to 28
U.S.c. § 153;17 or (4) certify to the Judicial Conference of the United
States a determination that the conduct of a federal judge might con
stitute grounds for impeachment,1s

III.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES

A.

The Judicial Status oj' Federal Administrative Law Judges and
the Need to Protect Their Decisional Independence

There were 1,147 administrative law judges employed by
twenty-nine federal agencies in 1983,19 They conduct trial-type hear
ings20 in administrative courts created by Congress under Article I of
12. Comment, supra note 4, at 571.
13. I. TEStTOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 11-12 (2d ed.
1980).
14. Browning, Evaluating Judicial Peiformance and Related Mailers, 90 F.R.D.
197,200-05 (1981); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c) (West Supp. 1983).
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c)(6)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 1983); see Chandler v. Judicial
Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
16. 28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c)(6)(B)(v), (vii) (West Supp. 1983).
17. Id. § 372(c)(6)(B)(vii).
18. Id. § 372(c)(7)(A).
19. 129 CONGo REc. S66IO (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). Of
that number, 820 were employed by the Social Security Administration. Id.
20. When engaged in the process of formal adjudication. the administrative tribu
nal is discharging a function equally as judicial as that of an Article III court engaged in
a similar process of formal adjudication. L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
417-21 (rev. ed. 1964). The conflicts are "every bit as fractious" as those resolved in
Article III courts. Butz V. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
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the United States Constitution. 21 Critics argue that administrative
law judges lack judicial status on the premise that their decisions
lack finality and that there are no sanctions for disobedience of their
orders. 22 Absent such indicia of judicial status, the argument runs,
there is no need to accord administrative law judges protection from
interference with their independence. In practice, however, decisions
of administrative law judges are often final and biDding and severe
sanctions may be imposed for disobedience of their orders. Thus,
administrative law judges do enjoy judicial status and the integrity
of the administrative adjudicatory process requires that administra
tive law judges be afforded adequate protection.
Although the Administrative Procedure Act provides certain
powers to all administrative law judges, other powers vary with the
statute and rules of practice of the agency involved in adjudication.
Administrative law judges generally make initial or recommended
decisions 23 that do not become final if an appeal is filed. 24 Some
agencies, however, accept the judge's decision as final and binding
unless the agency affirmatively decides to review the matter. 25 Thus,
judges' decisions, encompassing all findings of fact and conclusions
of law, are often final and binding.
Moreover, deference is accorded the administrative law judge's
observations of witness demeanor26 and, although the agency gener
ally has fact finding power on review of the judge's decision, the
21. These administrative courts are "Article I courts that go by the contemporary
name of 'administrative agencies.''' Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). Federal judges are appointed
and act pursuant to Article III of the constitution. Id. Other examples of Article I courts
include military courts martial, Vi., the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982), and the
Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C.A. § 171(a) (West Supp. 1983).
22. E. S. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICES AND PROCEDURE 118-19,
130 (3d ed. (979). Critics of administrative law judge judicial status also rely on the
argument that the administrative law judge "does not wear a robe." Id. at 119. In fact,
judges in at least nine agencies wear robes. Telephone interview with Judge Irving Som
mer, Assistant Chief Judge at the Occupational Safety and Health Admin. (Dec. 27,
(983).
23. An initial decision becomes the decision of the agency if no appeal is filed. A
recommended decision becomes the decision of the agency only when the agency makes
the decision. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982). '
24. Id.
25. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.9O(b)(3)
(1983); Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(I) (Supp.
V. 1981); Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 C.F.R. § 302.27(c) (1983); International Trade
Comm'n, 19 C.F.R. § 210.53(h) (1983).
26. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951); Eastern Engineer
ing & Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980).
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judge's findings of fact at least must be considered. 27 At some federal
agencies, the findings of judges are final and conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence,28 or unless clearly erroneous. 29 Thus, even if
the agency reviews and reconsiders a judge's conclusions of law, the
factual basis for such analysis may be conclusively determined by
the administrative law judge.
Finally, administrative law judges enjoy broad discretion in rul
ing on discovery matters, and their determinations are' reversed only
for a clear abuse of discretion. 30
Willful failure to comply with the administrative law judge'S
discovery orders may risk an assessment of reasonable expenses, in
cluding attorney fees, which may be awarded to the moving party.3'
Disobedience of a subpoena issued by the judge may result in an
enforcement proceeding brought by the agency,32 or, under some
statutes, a party's willful refusal to comply with a subpoena will re
sult in a criminal information being filed. 33 Disobedience of the
judge's lawful order may be considered contempt of the agency;34
sanctions may be applied against a party, including applying adverse
inferences, precluding the introduction of evidence, striking plead
ings or motions, or deciding the proceeding against the recalcitrant
party.3S Attorneys who refuse to comply with the judge's directions,
or who are disorderly, dilatory, obstructionist or contumacious or
who use contemptuous language, may be suspended and barred
27. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1982).
28. Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86, 90-92 (D.C. Cir., 1983) (Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission); 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(Department of Labor).
29. 19 C.F.R. § 21O.54(a)(ii)(C)(1983) (United States International Trade Commis
sion). The clearly erroneous standard applies to the findings of federal district courts.
FED. R. EVID. 52(a). The substantial evidence rule places a higher limitation on judicial
review. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.• 333 U.S. 364, 395-96 (1948). There
fore. the findings of administrative law judges subject to the substantial evidence rule
carry more weight than those of federal district court judges.
30. In re Boise Cascade Corp., 100 F.T.C. 512 (1982); FTC v. Heinz Kirchner, 14
AD. L. REp. 2d (P&F) 580, 581 (1963).
31. Cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,764-67 (1980) (such sanctions
are within a court's inherent powers). Administrative law judges ~ cases in adminis
trative courts. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
113 (1982).
32. See, e.g., FTC v. Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
33. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7210 (Supp. V 1981).
34. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(h) (1983).
35. International Union v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335-39 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB
v. C. H. Sprague & Son, Co., 27 AD. L. REp. 20 (P & F) 242, 244-45 (lst Cir. 1970).
Contra NLRB v. International Medication Systems. Ltd., 640 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir.
1981).
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from further participation in the proceeding. 36 They may also be
reprimanded or disbarred by the agency.37 Additionally, federal stat
utes provide a basis for imposition of criminal sanctions for viola
tions of protective orders issued by administrative law judges. 38
Thus, although many federal administrative law judges techni
cally are "employees" of the agency prosecuting the case before
them,39 there can be little doubt that their role is "functionally com
parable" to trial judges employed in the judicial branch. 40
The title "administrative law judge," formerly "hearing exam
iner," was adopted by statute in 1978.41 The legislative history of
that statute demonstrates that Congress intended to insure the inde
pendence and impartiality of administrative law judges: "In essence,
individuals appointed as Administrative Law Judges hold a position
with tenure very similar to that provided for federal judges under the
Constitution."42·
Judge Aldisert recently referred to the rigorous selection process
36. 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(d) (1983); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.80(e)(1983).
37. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(b)(1983); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.80(c)(1983).
38. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1621, 2071(a) (1982).
39. The Administrative Procedure Act, drafted in 1946, described the administra
tive law judge as the "presiding employee." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982). Prospective ad
ministrative law judges must pass a competitive examination by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). They are appointed by the employing agency from the list kept by
OPM. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
Most administrative law judges receive their pay and administrative suppon
through the agency prosecuting cases before them. Recently, in creating new agencies,
Congress has ensured the independence of administrative law judges from influence of
the enforcement agency. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29
U.S.C. § 661 (1976) and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 30
U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. V 1981), both are staJl'ed with judges and are independent from the
enforcing agency, the Department of Labor. See Sullivan, Independent Adjudication and
Occupational Safety anti Hea/," Policy,' A Test for Administrative Court neoT)', 31 AD. L.
REv. 177 (1979). Similarly, the National Transportation Safety Board, once pan of the
Department of Transportation, hears cases brought by pilots when the Federal Aviation
Agency issues license denials, suspensions or revocations. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1429
(1976).
40. Butt v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,513 (1978); Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15
(ld Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.ld 512, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Aldisen, J., concurring).
41. Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §§ 2-3, 92 Stat. 183, 183-84. For
example, refe~nces to administrative law judges were substituted for references to hear
ing examiners in both the section catchline and the text of 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
42. S. REP. No. 697, 95th Cong., 1st Scss. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo &; AD. NEWS 496, 497 (Under Article III of the United States Constitution, fed
eral judges hold life ten~ on "good behavior" and can be removed only by
impeachment).
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of administrative law judges43 and the protection of their indepen
dence afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act,44 and gave his
view of the judicial status of federal administrative law judges. Not
ing the past prejudice of some Article III federal judges, scholarly
critics and attorneys who believed that administrative law judges
43. NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp.• 657 F.2d 512. 527-28 (3d Cir. 1981) (A1dis
ert. J.• concurring).
[T)he selection process for [administrative law judges) should inspire more re
spect for this office than is generally extended by Article III judges; it is a pro
cess that requires rigorous inquiries into the background and competence of the
candidates. Applicants must supply twenty professional references. A mini
mum of seven years of litigation experience is required to meet the threshold
selection requirement. A test opinion must be drafted and evaluated on the
basis of many factors including clarity and conciseness. . . . Finally. after the
various scores have been combined. applicants considered tentatively eligible
are interviewed by a special panel usually composed of an OPM official, an
attorney qualified in the field of administrative law. and an agency official.
This committee submits a recommendation to the director of OPM who makes
final eligibility determinations among qualified candidates.
Id. at 527.
In the recent years. only twenty-eight percent of applicants for administrative law
judges have passed the examination and been put on the register. ranked by score. An
agency may then choose a new judge from the top three candidates on the register. SUB
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVT'L
AFFAIRS. THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE II SOCIAL SE
CURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM S. REp. No. III. 98th Cong.• lst Sess. 5. 6
(1983) [hereinafter cited as THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE).
44. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559.701-706. 1305.3105.3344.6362.7562 (1982). The Act
provides statutory protections for administrative law judges. Although each agency ap
points its own judges it may appoint only those certified as qualified by the Office of
Personnel Management. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). Judges are exempt from performance
evaluations by their agencies. id. § 4301. and can be removed only for cause established
after a due process hearing before the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). id.
§ 7521. They receive periodic step increases in pay without certification by their employ
ing agency that they are performing at an acceptable level of competence. Id. § 5335.
Once appointed a judge is not subjected to the usual probationary period for agency
employees. /d. § 3321(c). Administrative law judges can be disqualified from a case
only upon petition by either the agency or a private party. Id. § 556(b). Cases are as
signed to judges on a rotating basis. as far as practicable. so that agencies cannot fix the
results by choice of judge. Id. § 3105. Judges are independent of investigative or
prosecutorial personnel in the agency. Id. § 554(d). Parties present their case by oral
and documentary evidence. itI. § S56(d). and the transcript of testimony and exhibits.
together with the pleadings. constitute the exclusive record for decision. Id. § 556(e).
The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact.
law. or discretion presented on the record. Id. § 557(c). The judge may issue subpoenas.
rule on proffers of evidence. regulate the course of the hearing. and make or recommend
decisions. Id. § S56(c). Administrative law judges may not perform duties inconsistent
with their duties as judges. Id. § 3105. The judge may not consult any person or party.
including agency officials. concerning a fact at issue in the hearing. unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate. Id. § 554(d)(I).
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were second-class judges (if judges at all), marginally qualified and
too closely identified with the employing agency, he stated:
Accepting for purposes of argument that to be impartial
judges must be independent of all political or employment pres
sures, I submit that the view that the [administrative law judges]
are not sufficiently independent or competent is now so shopworn
as to be totally obsolete. To the contrary, [administrative law
judges], though not yet annointed with life tenure, enjoy an inde
pendence that in my view is plainly sufficient to satisfy reasonable
doubts. . . .
The rigors of the selection procedure and the statutory pro
tections of [administrative law judge] independence suggest to me
that the federal judiciary need not look down its collective nose at
[administrative law judge] decisions. 4s

The judicial status of federal administrative law judges pro
duces the same need for judicial independence as any other judge,
and proceedings for disciplining administrative law judges should be
conducted with this in mind. 46 Examination of current procedures
for disciplining administrative law judges demonstrates, however,
that this regard is sorely lacking.

B. The Lack of Peer Review
Federal administrative law judges can be removed by the
agency that employs them only for good cause established before the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after opportunity for a full
45.

NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldis

crt, J., concUJTing).

46. Despite the fact that the United States Congress designated the title of the posi
tion as '~udge", attorneys for the Social Security Administration address the administra
tive law judge as "Mr." in formal pleadings filed with the MSPB. See, e.g. ,In re Glover,
2 M.S.P.B. 70, 71 (1980); SSA v. Manion, No. HQ7521821008 (MSPB June 17, 1983);
(recommended decision of administrative law judge), adopted as modtfied, No.
HQ7521821008 (MSPB Feb. 6,1984); SSA v. Brennan, No. HQ7521810010 (MSPB June
23, 1983) (recommended decision of administrative law judge), rev'd and remanded, No.
HQ 7521820010 (MSPB Feb. 6,1984). Such pettiness is perhaps evidence of ignorance of
the judicial status of administrative law judges and certainly some proof that: "It seems
unwise to allow bureaucrats, whether lawyers or not, to determine, even in part. the fate
of judges." Kaufman, Chilling JlllliciallNkpendence, 88 YALE L. J. 681, 712 (1979)
(footnote omitted). The professional approach is to use respondent's title until the in
stant that it is taken away by due process of law by the appropriate authority. See
Spruancc v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 802-03, 532 P.ld 1209,
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 858 (1975).
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due process hearing is afforded. 47 The presiding official at the trial is
the "Board or an administrative law judge designated by the
Board."48The agency employing the administrative law judge initi
ates the action against the judge by filing a complaint with the
MSPB, and attorneys for the employing agency prosecute the case. 49
In other systems of judicial discipline in the United States, by
contrast, the decision to prosecute is generally made by a tribunal
either solely or partially comprised of other judges.so Such peer re
view of the decision to initiate formal disciplinary action has benefi
cial results.sl Frivolous complaints may be disposed of before they
become public. s2 For example, it is difficult to imagine that peers
would have initiated formal adjudication in In re Stecher, S3 where a
judge was suspended without pay for thirty days after a disagree
ment between the judge and the agency personnel director over the
office in which they would meet. S4 Furthermore, under a peer review
system, there would be informal contact with the judge before for
mal charges were filed. The respondent judge would be more likely
to agree to change the conduct complained about, without admitting
guilt, before the issue was publicly joined. ss Many of the less serious
matters could be resolveds6 by admonition, reprimand or censure. S7

u.s.c.

47. 5
§ 7521 (1982); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.131-.136 (1983).
48. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.132 (1983). Two administrative law judges, employed by the
MSPB, presently are eligible to hear these cases brought against judges.
49. Id. § 1201.134.
50. In no other system is the decision to prosecute made by representatives of a
party to proceedings heard by the judge.
51. Judges can best balance the need for judicial independence against the harm to
the reputation of the judiciary caused by a dishonest judge. Any tendency to overlook
misconduct by a colleague is outweighed by their desire to protect the integrity of the
judiciary. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial DisCipline, 54 CHI.(-]KENT L. REv.
I, 18-19 (1977).
52. Comment, supra note 4, at 571.
53. 11 AD. L. REp. 2D (P & F) 868 (Civil Service Comm'n 1961).
54. Id. at 881.
55. Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1131 (1966);
Comment, supra note 4, at 571; Winters, New Ways to Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 48
JUDlCAnJRE 163, 164 (Feb. 1965).
56. This proposal would require a change in 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982), and 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.133 (1983), which provide for the following as administrative law judge discipli
nary sanctions: removal. suspension, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough for 30 days
or less.
57. Admonition is a private discipline that declares the judge's conduct to have
been improper. Reprimand is a written notice to the judge that a commission has found
conduct to be unacceptable behavior under one of the grounds for discipline. Censure is
a more formal statement of guilt. Reprimand and censure may be public or private.
ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND
JUDGES 7, II (1979).
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Under the present system of disciplining federal administrative law
judges, these less serious matters apparently go unsanctioned or the
conduct is continued and culminates in a formal action of removal
or suspension.
When peers participate in the decision to bring an action to dis
cipline a judge, far more judges are informally sanctioned. 58 For ex
ample, all of the litigated federal administrative law judge
disciplinary proceedings have resulted in orders of removal or at
least twenty days suspension without pay.59 The state commission
system, providing peer review, has resulted in many less severe
penalties.
Between 1977 and 1982 the California Commission on Judicial
Performance issued thirty-nine private admonishments. 60 Eleven
judges retired or resigned during investigation of complaints brought
to the Commission. Four judges were publicly censured, two were
retired involuntarily and one was removed from office. 61 Between
1980 and 1982, the New York Commission removed nineteen judges,
censured thirty-seven, and informally warned fifty-one. 62 Between
1978 and 1982, the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards publicly
censured six judges, sixty-one were privately reprimanded, admon
ished or warned, and sixty agreed to correct their behavior. 63 In 1982
alone, in the United States there were forty-nine judges privately
censured by all state judicial disciplinary commissions; twenty-nine
58. Since most state judges face election, public criticism of a state judge is a severe
penalty. For example, no Minnesota judge receiving public discipline has been reelected.
Peterson &: Cassano, Stale's Policing ofJudges Among Most Aggressive in Nation, Minne
apolis Star and Tribune, Nov. 21, 1983, at A5, col. I.
59. In seven of the disciplinary cases brought against federal administrative law
judges in recent years, the penalty imposed has been suspension without pay. Six of
these cases were prosecuted by the Social Security Administration, which has a large
workload and backlog. Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 1954 n.2 (1983); Nash v.
Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1980). Suspension would mean shifting the work of
these errant judges to others, with attendant delay and hardship on innocent parties, In
re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 448, 252 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Minn. 1977); In ,e Kuehnel, 413
N.Y.S. 2d 809, 811 (N.Y. Ct. on the Judiciary 1978); In re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321,
331 (N.D. 1978). A more rational approach would be to impose a fine, which would also
help to pay for the proceeding. See 1982 MINN. BOARD OF JUD. STANDARDS ANN. REp.
6-7.
60. As of January 1, 1983, the California Commission had jurisdiction over 1308
judges. 1982 CAL. COMM'N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, REP. TO TIlE GOVERNOR 8.
61. Id. at 13.
62. ABA, Judicial Conduct Reporter, vols. 3-5, no. 3 (Fall 1980-1982).
63. Peterson &: Cassano, supra note 58, at 1, col. I; Note, Judicial Disciplinary Pro
ceedings in Minnesota, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 459, 475-76 (1981). Private reprimands
are disclosed to governors and United States Presidents considering whether to elevate
judges to higher courts. Minneapolis Star &: Tribune, Nov. 21, 1983, at A8, col. 3.
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were publicly censured; sixteen were removed from office; ten were
suspended without pay; and 191 were informally warned or
admonished.64
This system of graduated sanctions - ranging from private ad
monition to removal - seems a much more effective and precise
method of dealing with judicial indiscretion than the rigid, severe
sanctions now applied by the MSPB. Only in systems providing for
peer review have graduated sanctions been imposed.
IV.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Any procedure for disciplining judges should be created with
the principle of judicial independence as its polestar. Judge Irving
Kaufman describes the necessity for judicial independence as
follows:
In principle, the answer is clear: the judge must be assured un
equivocally that his legal decisions, no matter how unpopular, will
not threaten his term of office and that the only indignity he may
suffer for error is reversal. In short, he must be certain that disa
greeable views will not lead to personal punishment. Judges

should be removable only for the most serious offenses, and then
only by an especially cautious procedure. It is essential to remem
ber that provisions protecting judicial tenure were "not created for
the benefit of the judges, but for the benefit of the judged."6s

A. Proposed Structural Changes in Adjudication of Cases Involving
Administrative Law Judges·

The United States Congress has received in recent years two
proposals which would change the procedure by which federal ad
ministrative law judges are disciplined. Both would provide peer
participation in the investigation of formal disciplinary proceedings.
In 1980, the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference
(FALJC),66 proposed a bill to the House Committee on Post Office
and Civil Service67 which would have established a peer review sys
64. ABA, Judicial Conduct Reporter, vol. 5, no. 3 (Fall 1983).
65. Kaufman, supra note 46, at 690 (citing Kurland, The Constitution and tile Ten
ure of Federal Judges: Some Notesfrom History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665,698 (1969».
66. The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference is an unincorporated as
sociation of about 800 federal administrative law judges, and was previously known as
"The Federal Trial Examiners Conference." See Ramspeck v. Trial Examiners Confer
ence, 345 U.S. 128, 129 (1953).
67. H.R. 6768, 96th Cong., 2d Scss. (1980).
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tern for federal administrative law judges similar to the commission
and judicial council systems employed to discipline state and federal
judges. Under the proposal, the Chairman of the Administrative
Conference of the United States would have been the chairman of a
committee68 to provide peer participation in the investigation of
complaints regarding administrative law judges, and in the decision
to institute disciplinary action. Half of the members of the commit
tee, not counting the chairman, would be administrative law judges.
The other members would have been lay and professional persons
from both private and public sectors. Terms of membership would
have been staggered to prevent control of the committee by an
administration. 69
On May 12, 1983, Senator Heflin of Alabama introduced Senate
bill 1275,70 a bill creating a unified corps of federal administrative
law judges. Under Senate bill 1275, no judge would be employed by
the agency instituting an action; thus, the judge hearing the case
would be independent of the agency. The policymaking body of the
Corps would be composed of a chief judge and several division chief
judges. 71 The bill also provides for removal and discipline of admin
istrative law judges, with investigation of complaints against judges
to be conducted by a "Complaint Resolution Board" which would
function very much like a federal judicial council in the case of disci
plinary proceedings against federal judges.72
Peer participation in judicial disciplining of administrative law
judges could also be achieved by the creation of a Commission on
Performance of Federal Administrative Law Judges, composed of,73
68. The mere existence of such a committee would undoubtedly help maintain
public confidence in administrative law judges and create a greater awareness of proper
judicial behavior on the part ofjudges, two of the fundamental purposes ofjudicial disci
pline. ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, PROFESSIONAL DISCI
PLINE FOR LAwYERS AND JUDGES 14 (1979).
69. See H.R. 6768, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
70. 129 CONGo REc. S6609 (daily cd. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
71. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 565(a».
72. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 659). One commentator has suggested
the creation of a performance review board established to conduct periodic performance
appraisals of administrative law judges and to handle complaints of undue interference
in the judge's duties by agency officials. The review board could take varying degrees of
disciplinary action against judges subject to appeal to the MSPB, except that removal
cases should be subject to de novo hearings by the MSPB. Lubbers, Federal Administra
tive Law Judges: A Focus of Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 AD. L. REv. 109, 128 (1981). A
similar proposal was made in Marquardt & Wheat, Hilklen Al/oeDtors, 2 LAW & POL'y Q.
472,490 (1980).
73. The composition of state judicial disciplinary commissions varies in number
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for example, five administrative law judges, two attorneys, and two
public members, all appointed by the President with a four year
term. 74 The Commission would have the power to investigate allega
tions of wrongdoing by administrative law judges and to settle infor
mally with the accused judge, as well as to initiate formal
proceedings to be litigated before the MSPB with prosecution to be
handled by the special counsel of that agency.7S
Even under the present system, once formal adjudicatory pro
ceedings have been initiated by the agency employing the judge,
peer participation in the adjudication of the disciplinary proceeding
could be accomplished by expanding the number of judges who
would make the recommended decision in adjudications before the
MSPB. Those cases are presently heard by one of two administrative
law judges employed by the MSPB. Instead, these disciplinary cases
could be heard by a panel of three administrative law judges with
two of them being employed by agencies other than the MSPB or the
prosecuting agency but assigned on rotation from a list kept by the
Office of Personnel Management.16 To help ensure fairness, the re
spondent judge could be given two peremptory challenges.
There is precedent for such a judicial tribunal to sit at discipli
nary proceedings. The California commission system for disciplining
judges - the model for all such present state judicial disciplinary
proceedings - has had a provision for a three-judge panel since
1966.77 The United States Department of Labor employs a similar
and type of members. I. TESITOR &: D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 28
38 (2d ed. 1980).
74. Disciplinary councils composed of judges apparently are not very active.
Neither the judicial councils of federal judges under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1976), see supra
note 14, nor the Labor Department Advisory Committee, see infra note 78 and accom
panying text, have resulted in disciplinary action against judges. Telephone interviews
with Terrence J. Brooks, Assistant Director for Judicial Conduct Organizations, Febru
ary 21, 1984, and Judge Everette E. Thomas, Associate Chief Judge, Department of La
bor, Feb. IS, 1984. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may have
issued a private reprimand for misconduct to a district judge in the Northern District of
Indiana. Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 4, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
75. The special counsel is already authorized to prosecute certain categories of
cases before the MSPB. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1206(g) (1982).
76. OPM presently keeps a list of administrative law judges who have volunteered
for assignment to hear cases brought by agencies with backlogs of cases or agencies such
as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which do not employ judges on a perma
nent basis.
77. See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 517
n.3, 526 P.2d 268, 272 n.3, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 264 n.3 (1974). Rule 907 of the California
Rules of Court states: "(T]he commission shall order a hearing to be held before it con
cerning the censure, removal or retirement of the judge, or the commission may request
the Supreme Court to appoint three special masters, who shall be judges of courts of
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system78 and three-member panels are also suggested by the ABA
for both judicial and lawyer disciplinary hearings. 79 This suggested
procedure could be accomplished by changing the MSPB rule to in
corporate these changes. 80
These proposed systems of peer participation in disciplinary
proceedings would be as effective as the present system in removing
and disciplining errant administrative law judges,81 and they would
better accomplish the fundamental principle upon which standards
ofjudicial discipline are based: "[T]he major purpose ofjudicial dis
cipline is not to punish judges but to protect the public and, thus,
preserve the integrity ofjudicial process, maintain public confidence
in the judiciary, and create a greater awareness of proper judicial
behavior on the part of judges themselves."82

B. Good Cause as the Standardfor RemOVing Federal
Administrative Law Judges
Cases decided by the MSPB use a broad and expanding inter
pretation of the statutory "good cause"83 by which federal adminis
trative law judges are disciplined. 84 The standard for removal of
judges applied by the MSPB, while based on the requirement of
record, to hear and take evidence in such matters." CAL. R. OF COURT 907. New Jersey,
New Mexico and Wyoming have similar provisions. In re Yengo, 72 N.J. 425, 427, 371
A.2d 41. 43 (1977); Martinee v. Members of Judicial Standards Comm'n, 386 F. Supp.
169. 170 n.l, 171 (D.N.M. 1974); In re Johnson. 568 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1977).
78. Under the procedures adopted by the Secretary of Labor, complaints of mis
conduct of Labor Department administrative law judges may be referred for limited in
formal inquiry to an advisory committee made up of three judges appointed by the chief
judge. This peer review program covers eighty-four judges. Procedures for Internal
Handling of Complaints of Judicial Misconduct. 46 Fed. Reg. 28,050 (1981).
79. ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 43.87 (1979).
SO. The present applicable rule of practice of the MSPB is 5 C.F.R. § 1201.132
(1983). which states: ''The presiding official in all cases brought under this section shall
be the Board or an administrative law judge designated by the Board." Id.
Until 1980. the applicable MSPB rule would have allowed the appointment of such
three judge panels. ''The Commission, or member of the Commission, or one or more
administrative law judges appointed under section 3105 of Title 5, United States Code
shall preside at any hearing under this subpart." 5 C.F.R. § 930.226 (1977).
81. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
82. ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 14 (1979).
83. The statutory basis for these standards is found in 5 U.S.c. § 7521 (1982),
which states that "(a)n action may be taken against an administrative law judge. . .by
the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only for good cause. . . ."
Id.
84. ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 14 (1979).
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showing "good cause," has broadened in the cases decided by the
Board, and by administrative law judges employed by the Board. 8s
Standards applied include: inefficiency, through low productivity;86
conduct subjecting the agency to adverse criticism or disrepute;87 vi
olations of the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Judicial
Conduct,88 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility for attorneys,89
agency canons of conduct,90 or generally accepted rules of conduct;91
detriment to efficiency, good order and proper function of agency;92
and violation of a government-wide regulation of government em
ployees requiring that courtesy, consideration and promptness must
be shown in dealing with other government employees. 93
Such broad and amorphous standards may impinge on judicial
independence,94 making more difficult the securing of fair and com
petent judges who are the "heart of formal administrative
adjudications."9s
On February 6, 1984, the MSPB held that the Social Security
Administration had failed to show good cause to remove an admin
istrative law judge for low productivity in Social Security Administra
tion v. Goodman .96 The recommended decision found that, although
Judge Robert Goodman was industrious and conscientious, he made
too many detailed findings and was inefficient, having decided ap
proximately sixteen cases a month compared to the agency average
85. See cases cited supra note 2.
86. SSA v. Goodman, No. HQ7521821005 (MSPB June 23,1983) (recommended
decision of administrative law judge), rev'd, No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984);
see supra note 2.
87. See Hasson v. Hampton, 34 AD. L. REP. 20 (P & F) 819 (D. D.C. 1973); Mc
Eachern v. Macy, 233 F. Supp. 516 (W.D.S.C. 1964), tifl'd, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965);
see supra note I.
88. In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980); see also, Chocallo v. Bureau of Hearings
& Appeals, 548 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa.), a./Td in part and vacated and remanded in pari,
673 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir.), cerro denied, 103 S. Ct. 128 (1982).
89. In re Spielman, I M.S.P.B. 50 (1979); see supra note 2.
90. Hasson v. Hampton, 34 AD. L. REP. 20 (P & F) 819 (D.D.C. 1973).
91. In re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 70 (1980).
92. In re Stecher, 11 AD. L. REP. 20 (P & F) 868, 878 (Civil Service Comm'n 1961);
see supra note I. But see SSA v. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984);
see infra text accompanying notes 96-102; SSA v. Davis, No. HQ75218210026 (MSPB.
Feb. 6, 1984); see infra note 104.
93. In re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 70 (1980).
94. Kaufman, supra note 46, at 690 (citing Kurland, Tlte Constitution and tlte Ten
ure of Federal Judges: Some Notesfrom History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 698 (1969».
95. Arr'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1941).
96. No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
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of thirty to thirty-two cases.97 The MSPB held that the recom
mended decision improperly equated the "good cause"98 test with
"efficiency of the service,"99 but that, as a matter oflaw, low produc
tivity could constitute the basis for a removal of an administrative
law judge. 100 The MSPB found, however, that the evidence did not
establish the comparability of the statistics used to measure produc
tivity.lOl The nationwide average was not a measurement of reason
able productivity because it included different types of cases and
dispositions such as dismissals, full opinions, short form reversals,
and affirmances, both on the written record and after a hearing.
"Only if approximately the same amount of time was required to
render most final dispositions" or "if the complexities presented by
the mix of cases assigned to the respondent mirrored the complexi
ties of those included in the national average," would the MSPB be
justified in inferring that comparative productivity could be mea
sured by case disposition statistics. lo2
MSPB's interpretation in Goodman of "good cause"I03 under 5
97. No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 4, 20 (MSPB Apr. 6, 1983)(rccommended deci
sion of administrative law judge). An average of forty-five dispositions per month is
currently the goal. Dunlavey, AU's Pressured to Expedite Social Security Cases, Legal
Times of Wash., Apr. 2, 1984, at 5, col. 4.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982).
99. Other federal employees may be removed, without a prior hearing, for "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982); see Arnell v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Inefficiency under the section 7513 test includes taking
too much time to perform an assignment. Perlstein v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 865
(1968).
100. SSA v. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 18 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
101. Id The MSPB found that "no evidence was offered regarding the time re
quired to render dispositions or comparing respondent's assignments with those included
in the national average," but then referred to the testimony of two agency witnesses that
most of the cases were similar and that it was unusual for anyone case to be more time
consuming than another. Id The opinion cites the testimony of another witness that the
cases did vary in difficulty, and the statements of agency counsel at oral argument 
apparently on the basis that such statements constituted an authorized admission - that
the cases were not fungible, that the average productivity figures were not offered to
prove the existence of a standard measurement of reasonable productivity, and that even
with a random assignment method, a judge could have been assigned a disproportionate
share of difficult and time-consuming cases. Id.
102. Id. at 18. Another relevant consideration, not mentioned in the opinion,
would be the comparable history of the judge's cases on appeal. If a low producing
judge's cases are almost always upheld on appeal. he may in fact be more, "productive"
than a high producer who is often reversed on appeal.
103. MSPB dismissed the argument that the good cause standard should be
equated very neady with the "good behavior" standard applied to federal judges by the
Constitution under which they can be removed only on impeachment and conviction of
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Id. at 7,6-10. The opinion
relies heavily on a statement by Senator McCarran, the author of the Administrative
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U.S.c. § 7521 (a) is very broad, adumbrating that administrative law
judges may have even less tenure rights than other federal employ
ees. In holding that "good cause" was not the equivalent of the "effi
ciency of the service" test, MSPB stated that:
The good cause and the efficiency of the service standards are dif
ferent. While traditional chapter 75 cases provide guidance in sec
tion 7521 cases, the efficiency of the service is not imputed into the
good cause standard. There may well be specific fact situations
which would meet both standards, but the standards are distinct.
We reserve, for later cases, the questions of whether good cause is
a stricter standard and whether good cause could ever be based
upon facts which would not also have satisfied the efficiency of the
service standard. 104

This broad interpretation of "good cause" seems inconsistent
with the intent to make administrative law judges "independent and
secure in their tenure,"IOS and "'functionally comparable' to"l06 and
" 'very nearly the equivalent of" judges employed in the judicial
branch. 107
The amorphous phrase "good cause" could, however, be made
Procedure Act, made in debate, that it is the duty of the courts to determine the meaning
of the words and phrases of the bill.ld. at 6 (citing S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
326 (1946». Since courts have already upheld removals ofadministrative law judges for
financial irresponsibility, insubordination and intemperate behavior and bias - lesser
faults than those that would justifY removal under the constitutional "good behavior"
standard - MSPB was convinced that it was not bound by the "good behavior" stan
dard.ld. at 8. MSPB cited Ramspcck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S.
128, 143 n.9 (1953) for the proposition that the "Supreme Court rejected an assertion the
Congress, in enacting the APA, intended (administrative law judges) to be very nearly
the equivalent of federal judges." ld. at 8 n.6. In fact, the Court in Ramspeck rejected the
assertion, not on the merits, but because it was written five years after the Act was passed.
345 U.S. at 143 n.9. In the contemporaneous Senate Report on the APA, however, Sena
tor McCarran made clear that Congress intended the administrative law judges (then
"examiners") were to have tenure very nearly equivalent to that enjoyed by federal
judges. He said that the APA "relie(d) upon independence, salary, security, and tenure
during good behavior of examiners within the framework of the civil service. . . ." S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 193,303 (1946) (emphasis added).
104. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at IS, n.8. In SSA v. Davis, No.
HQ75218210026 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984), decided the same day as Goodman, the Board
seemed to rely in part on a rule very similar to the efficiency of the service test in deter
mining good cause for a judge'S removal. The Board held that good cause included
judge's conduct which has "a disruptive effect on the work place and which tends to
erode confidence in the administrative adjudicatory process." ld at 4.
105. Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
106. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
107. Ramspcck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 144 (1953)
(Black, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Doc. No. 82, 82d Cong., lst Scss. 9 (1931».
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more specific. lOS For example, the disciplinary standard for the
United States Court of Claims, an Article I court,l09 is relatively
clear: "Removal of a judge of the United States Claims
Court...shall be only for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of
duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical or mental
disability." 110
C. Burden ofProof
The burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings against federal
administrative law judges presently requires only that the agency
prove the charge by a preponderance ofthe evidence. 11 I Because of
the possible impact of these proceedings on judicial independence,
this standard should be made more stringent.
The burden of proof in state judicial disciplinary proceedings
requires that allegations of misconduct be proved by a preponder
ance of the evidence in six states and by clear and convincing evi
dence sufficient to sustain the charges to a reasonable certainty in
sixteen states. 112 The standard employed by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey regarding removal of a judge is proof beyond a reason
able doubt. 113
The burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings brought against
108. The ABA standard for judicial discipline is an example of one which is too
specific. It provides:
Grounds for discipline should include:
(a) Conviction of a felony;
(b) Willful misconduct in office;
(c) Willful misconduct which, although not related to judicial duties, brings the
judicial office into disrepute;
(d) Conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice or conduct unbecoming
a judicial officer, whether conduct in office or outside ofjudicial duties, that
brings the judicial office into disrepute;
(e) Any conduct that constitutes a violation of judicial conduct or professional
responsibility.
ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAW
YERS AND JUDOES 29 (1979).
109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 171(a) (West Supp. 1983).
110. Id. § 176. Similarly, removal of bankruptcy judges can be "only for incompe
tency, misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability." Id. § 153(b).
111. SSA v. Brennan, No. HQ75218210010, slip op. at 17 (MSPB June 23, 1983)
(recommended decision of administrative law judge), rev'd on other groundr, No.
HQ75218210010 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984). Cf Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 100-03 (1981)
(standard of proof in administrative adjudications under the APA is the preponderance
of the evidence standard); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.56, 1201.131 (1983).
112. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY DI
GEST 196-98 (1960-1978).
113. In re Hardt,72 N.J. 160, 165,369 A.2d 5, 7 (1917).
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federal administrative law judges should at least require proof to a
reasonable certainty and that any reasonable doubts should be re
solved in favor of the accused judge. I 14
D. Low Productivity
In Goodman, the MSPB held that administrative law judges can
be removed for inefficiency based on low productivity. I IS Generally,
a judge should not be removed absent proof of dereliction of duty. I 16
In social security disability cases, moreover, there is a basic obliga
tion on the administrative law judge in these non-adversarial pro
ceedings to develop a full and fair record and to scrupulously and
conscientiously explore all of the relevant facts. 117 The judge must,
therefore, be afforded enough time to research and investigate a case
and to develop and examine all of the available evidence. As judges
are pressured to increase their productivity, they are forced to devote
less time to developing the evidence and the claimant's right to a full
and fair hearing may be jeopardized. I IS
Recognizing the problems involved in removal cases based
solely on lack of production, the Goodman opinion implies that the
agency could promote higher productivity by ordering the judge ''to
take reasonable steps to improve his productivity."1l9 As support,
Social Security Administration v. Manion 120 was cited, in which, on
the same day, the MSPB upheld sanctions against a judge who failed
114. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, \0 Cal. 3d 270, 275, 515 P.2d
I, 4, I \0 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (1973).
115. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 12.
116. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 535, 526
P.2d 268, 285, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 276 (1974). In McCartney, a judge was censured for
several instances of misbehavior. The California Supreme Court, however, held that his
conduct in delaying court proceedings for periods of up to thirty minutes while he stared
at the ceiling meditating about a ruling and running proceedings far into evening hours,
was not misconduct and should be handled by the administrative process rather than
formal discipline. Although the court found that the judge's "languor" and "inefficiency"
caused, among other problems, "considerable strain on the municipal court calendar," he
was conscientious and made a determined effort to conduct his share of the affairs before
the court; his inefficiency stemmed from an unrealistic and unjustified attention to details
and not a neglect of responsibility. The court held, therefore, that "a judge should not be
disciplined for inefficiency absent proof of dereliction of duty. . . ." Id. at 535 n.12, 526
P.2d at 285 n.12, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 276 n.12.
117. Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 1959 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982»; Narrol v. Heckler, No.
81-0\347, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1984).
118. THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, supra note 43, at 17.
119. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 16.
120. No. HQ75218210008 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
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to obey instructions to schedule cases. 12I Rather than instructing a
judge to hold a particular set of hearings, higher productivity might
be achieved, with less interference with the judicial function, by set
ting a time limit by which a case must be disposed.1 22
There is a precedent for time limits imposed on the conduct of
administrative adjudicatory proceedings. The Federal Trade Com
mission, for example, requires the judge to hold a prehearing confer
ence in a complex case within forty-five days after the filing of the
answer to the complaint,123 and to state the issues within thirty days
after the conference. 124 The judge's initial decision must be filed
within ninety days after the record is closed.1 25 And, in unfair trade
cases, a statute requires the United States International Trade Com
mission to make its determination within one year, or eighteen
months in complex cases. 126 Rather than the ad hoc instruction to a
particular judge to set a hearing schedule, general time limitations
for the disposition of social security disability cases would seem
more reasonable, and would allow the judges to continue to control
their own docket. 127
121. Id. at 9.
122. Numerous courts have ordered time limits on Social Security cases. E.g.• Day
v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19.22-23 (2d Cir. 1982). cerl. granted. 5 I U.S.L.W. 3774 (Dec. 5.
1983); see Goodman, No. HQ75218210015. slip op. at 3 (MSPB) (citing cases); Caswell v.
Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978).
123. 16 C.F.R. § 3.21(b)(1) (1983).
124. Id. § 3.2 I (b)(3).
125. Id. § 3.5 I(a).
126. 19 U.S.c. § 1337(b)(1) (1983).
127. In addition to the monthly production quota, the Social Security Administra
tion staff allegedly review the work of judges outside of the Administration's normal
appellate process. The Administration's review procedures include giving the judges
mandatory instructions on the length of hearings and opinions. evidence required, and
use of expert witnesses, as well as monitoring, counseling, and admonishing judges
whose decisions deviate from a fifty percent average rate favorable to claimants. Nash v.
Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1980). The validity of these practices is currently being
litigated in Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Heckler, No. 83-124 (D.D.C.
filed Jan. 19, 1983).
Thomas Babington Macaulay provided a vivid description of review outside of the
normal appellate process conducted by Frederic the Great whose opinions were not al
ways followed by judges:
The resistance opposed to him by the tribunals inflamed him to a fury. He
reviled his Chancellor. He kicked the shins of his Judges. He did not, it is true,
intend to act unjustly. He firmly believed that he was doing right. and defend
ing the cause of the poor against the wealthy. Yet this well-meant meddling
probable did far more harm than all the explosions of his evil passions during
the whole of his long reign. We could make shift to live under a debauchee or a
tyrant; but to be ruled by a busybody is more than human nature can bear.
3 MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 278-79 (1901).

828

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:807

A lazy and irresponsible administrative law judge should, of
course, be disciplined. 128 If judicial independence is not to be dimin
ished, however, the judge who is steady, earnest and energetic should
not be punished for an output that is lower than the average. Rather,
the judge should be helped administratively through, for example,
additional clerical helpl29 or advice from the chief judge of the
agency. Reasonable time limits for final disposition of cases, stated
in statute or regulation, could help prod slower judges, but to at
tempt efficiency by requiring a tightly controlled production line ef
fort in turning out decisions would usurp a judicial function.

v.

CONCLUSION

Administrative law judges are, in fact, judges and must conduct
themselves in the performance of their duties according to standards
of acceptable behavior. The principle ofjudicial independence, how
ever, distinguishes disciplinary proceedings brought against judges
from those brought against other civil servants: "Our judicial system
can better survive the much discussed but rarely existent senile or
inebriate judge than it can withstand the loss of judicial indepen
dence that would ensue if removal of judges could be effected by a
procedure too facile or a standard too mallable."130
Unlike any other disciplinary proceeding involving judges,
those proceedings against federal administrative law judges are now
prosecuted by the agency which employs the judge. The agency is
usually a party to cases regularly heard by the judge. The appear
ance of impropriety is manifest in having a party to a judge's cases
able to prosecute the judge for alleged disciplinary infractions.
Participation by administrative law judges in disciplining other
administrative law judges - especially in the decision to bring
charges - would advance judicial independence, while increased
use of graduated sanctions, with emphasis on early and frequent in
formal sanctions of questionable judicial conduct, would protect the
public and preserve the government's investment in trained federal
administrative law judges.

128. Canon 3 of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should
be diligent. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuer Canon 3 (1972).
129. In Goodman, the MSPB reserved decision on whether an instruction to use the
services of a decision writer would constitute improper interference with the judicial
function. No. HQ7S21821001S, slip op. at 16 n.l1.
130. Kaufman, supra note 46, at 68 \.

